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Abstract 
 
We conducted a questionnaire study with student subjects to look for explicit 
correlations between selected biological characteristics of the subjects and manifestation 
of the Allais paradox in the pattern of their choices between sets of two pairs of risky 
prospects. We find that particular bio-characteristics, such as gender, menstrual cycle, 
mother’s age, parenthood, digit ratio, perceived negative life events, and emotional 
state, can be related to the paradox. Women, in particular if not menstruating, are less 
susceptible to the paradox. Those born to not-too-young mothers are also less prone to 
the paradox. The same holds true for those who father children, those with high prenatal 
testosterone exposure, who have reported many negative life events, and those who 
were anxious, excited, aroused, happy, active, and fresh at the time of the experiment. 
Further, left-handers and atheists may be less inclined to exhibit the paradox. 
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1. Introduction 
Expected utility theory, the mainstream’s economic theory of risky decision making, 
cannot accommodate the puzzle that ubiquitously emerges in questionnaires known as 
the Allais (1953) paradox. Consider the two pairs of situations (described in detail 
below): A and B along with C and D. Situation A is the certainty of receiving 100 
million, whereas Situation B is a 10 percent chance of winning 500 million, an 89 
percent chance of winning 100 million, and a 1 percent chance of winning nothing. 
Situation C is an 11 percent chance of winning 100 million, and an 89 percent chance of 
winning nothing, whereas Situation D is a 10 percent chance of winning 500 million, 
and a 90 percent chance of winning nothing. Expected utility theory predicts that 
preference of A over B should entail the preference of C over D, and conversely. 
However, people often violate that. 
Allais himself explains the paradox by the expected utility theory’s neglection of 
two basic psychological features: (1) the non-identity of monetary and psychological 
values, and (2) it does not suffice to consider only the mathematical expectation of 
utility; its distribution as a whole about its mean should also be taken into account 
(Allais, 2008). When very large sums are involved in comparison with the 
psychological capital of the subject, there is strong dependence between different 
gambles and probabilities. This can entail very strong risk aversion in the neighborhood 
of certainty, and preference for risk far from certainty. 
Interestingly, Allais (2008) observed the utility curve derived from his 
experiments to bear similarity to the expression for psycho-physiological sensation as a 
function of luminous stimulus. This prompted us to perform deep research on the more 
general biological roots of the Allais paradox. Here, we investigate whether a subject’s 
  
 
 
biological characteristic makes him or her more prone to display the paradox. 
We apply the variants of the Allais example used by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) to 120 student subjects. We also apply a pre-questionnaire to gather information 
about a subject’s gender and age, whether they father children, their second-to-fourth 
digit ratio, current emotional state, perceived negative life events, and whether they 
believe in God. We find that particular states of these “bio-characteristics” are related to 
the paradox. 
The rest of this article is organized as follows: next, we provide a brief overview 
of the findings relating risk and bio-characteristics to justify our own characteristics 
selected in the pre-questionnaire; then, we explain the Allais paradox in detail, and the 
test statistics used; the content of the questionnaire is then described, that is, the 
questions for which the subjects responded, which are related to the Allais paradox; the 
subsequent section describes the data gathered from both questionnaires; finally, we 
present the results and a conclusion. 
Attitudes toward risk and their relation to biological characteristics 
The biological roots of decision making under risk do matter. Now, we provide a brief 
overview of findings to justify that. This allows us to conjecture that some biological 
characteristics of the subjects should also be considered for the Allais paradox. In what 
follows, we focus on our selected bio-characteristics, namely gender, age, parenthood, 
handedness, second-to-fourth digit ratio, current emotional state, perceived negative live 
events, and religiousness. 
Gender 
Differences in behavior between the sexes do exist and may reflect differences between 
the brains of males and females. Men have more gray matter (central bodies of nerve 
  
 
 
cells) and less white matter (filaments that connect nerve cells) than women do. That is 
why men rely more on gray matter for their IQ, whereas women rely more on white 
matter. Female brains seem to be hardwired for understanding emotions, and male 
brains for understanding and building systems. It has to be said, however, that the 
differences between the sexes tend to be exaggerated. Meta-analyses of several studies 
suggest that men are only slightly better than women in spatial ability and physical 
aggression, while women are slightly better in smiling, spelling, and indirect aggression; 
however, there is no significant difference in mathematical problem solving, 
vocabulary, and reading comprehension. 
 Gender differences may also be important for risk taking. If anything, women 
are more risk averse. Portfolios of single women are commonly less risky than those of 
single men. Female risk aversion may arise from the fact that women are relatively 
more pessimistic and insensitive to probabilities. However, all this experimental 
evidence may be framing dependent. Men are also believed to be more overconfident 
than women. Because overconfidence leads to overtrading and lower returns, men 
appear to be less “rational” than women on this matter (Da Costa Jr et al., 2008). Thus, 
we will look for explicit correlations between a subject’s gender and their pattern of 
violation to expected utility theory through the Allais paradox. 
We also find it worthwhile focusing on particular female characteristics such as 
ovulation and menstruation, which are related to hormonal changes. The onset of 
menstruation corresponds closely with the hormonal cycle, and women may experience 
emotional disturbances associated with menstruation. Women’s sexual desire also 
changes near ovulation, and this may interfere with their decision making under risk 
and, perhaps, with their propensity to display the Allais paradox. Thus, we asked in our 
  
 
 
pre-questionnaire whether female subjects were either ovulating or menstruating. These 
bio-characteristics were then related to the pattern of violation to expected utility theory 
in the questionnaire. (Eckel and Grossman, 2008 provide an excellent survey on the 
relationship between the gender and the risk.) 
Here, we find that gender does matter, and menstrual cycle, too. In our 
experiment, men are more prone to show the Allais paradox. Among the women, those 
who were menstruating at the time of the experiment were more predisposed to incur in 
the paradox in their choices of risky prospects. 
Age 
In the case of behavior, age is considered to be important. There is not much difference 
between a 25-year-old brain and a 75-year-old brain. However, hormonal factors trigger 
a need to impress peers by reckless behavior, and this inability to perceive risks 
accurately is high in the years between 10 and the mid-20s. Moreover, an urge for 
“sensation seeking” reaches a peak during the late teen years, and then declines 
gradually throughout life. Those who are higher in sensation seeking tend to have higher 
levels of testosterone than others. Sensation seekers also tend to have low levels of 
monoamine oxidase, an enzyme that regulates serotonin, which in turn regulates mood. 
People with low monoamine oxidase levels tend to smoke and drink more than others 
and are more likely to have a criminal record. All this allows us to conjecture that 
people under 25 years of age show a pattern of behavior related to the Allais paradox 
that differs from that of older subjects. 
We also conjecture that mother’s age affects a boy’s predisposition to the Allais 
paradox. Boys born to young mothers are at the high risk of committing crime in 
adolescence. Maternal rejection, erratic behavior on the part of parents, and lack of 
  
 
 
parental supervision are among the best predictors of juvenile delinquency. Having a 
teenage mother roughly doubles a boy’s propensity to commit crime. (For an overview 
that goes deeper by studying the neural basis of the relationship between the age and the 
risk taking, see Lee et al., 2008.) 
In this study, we find that boys born to young mothers (a variable measured by 
taking mother’s age minus son’s age ≤ 25 years) were less prone to exhibit the Allais 
paradox. 
Parenthood 
Growing kids alter behavior (and perhaps, indirectly, one’s attitude toward risk) because 
neural and hormonal interactions are involved in nurturing babies. Estrogen triggers an 
increase in oxytocin (a hormone-like substance that promotes bonding patterns) in the 
expectant mother, and this affects her brain to promote maternal behavior. Prolactin also 
promotes care-giving behavior and directs brain reorganization to favor maternal 
behavior. Live-in father’s oxytocin levels also rise toward the end of his mate’s 
pregnancy. Vasopressin (known as the “monogamy hormone”) also plays a role in the 
father by promoting brain reorganization toward paternal and family bonding behavior. 
Vasopressin can reinforce father’s testosterone level to protect his mate and child, but 
tempers his aggression, making him less capricious. Father’s prolactin levels also rise 
after cohabitation with the child. Elevated prolactin levels in both the nursing mother 
and involved father cause some reduction in their testosterone levels, even though they 
also raise the pleasure hormones known as opioids. Fathers usually have lower salivary 
testosterone levels than unmarried men and married non-fathers. (On this subject, see 
Gray et al., 2002 and references therein.) 
We thus conjecture that parenthood may be related to whether a subject is more 
  
 
 
or less prone to violate expected utility theory. Here, we find that childless subjects are 
more prone to show the Allais paradox. 
Handedness 
Approximately 10 to 13 percent of any population is left-handed. However, no one 
knows the exact reason why the human population is right-hand dominant. Genetics 
certainly plays a role, but it is certainly not the only factor behind left-handedness. For 
instance, even when both parents are left-handed, there is only a 26 percent chance of 
their child being left-handed. The proportion of left-handers remained constant over 
30,000 years. This suggests that there exists an evolutionary role for left-handers, which 
have a “surprise” factor in combat, and also that the forces causing left-handedness are 
independent of culture. 
Left-handed people occupy the extremes when it comes to health and ability. 
There are more left-handed people with IQs over 140 than right-handed people. Left-
handedness has also been associated with talent in music and sports. This may partly be 
due to the fact that left-handers have an intrinsic neurological advantage over right-
handers. Males are three times more likely to be left-handed than females. Homosexuals 
may be up to 39 percent as likely to be left-handed as heterosexuals. Left-handedness 
has also been linked to epilepsy, Down’s syndrome, autism, and mental retardation. 
Left- handed peoples’ life spans are shorter than those of their right-handed counterparts 
by as much as 9 years, which in part may be due to the prevalence of right-handed tools 
in society: left-handers are more prone to accidents. (See Raymond et al., 1996 and 
references therein for a full coverage of left-handedness.) 
All this allows us to conjecture that risky choices are made differently by left-
handed people. Left-handers may also display a distinct pattern of violation to expected 
  
 
 
utility theory than that of right-handers. This study suggests that right-handers are more 
susceptible to the Allais paradox, though this result lacked a statistical significance in 
our sample. 
Second-to-fourth digit ratio 
Second-to-fourth digit ratio is a marker for prenatal testosterone exposure. Thanks to 
that, it may influence choice under risk. It may also be related to a subject’s 
predisposition to the Allais paradox. High-testosterone men can be tracked by a 
relatively long-ring finger. Men tend to have lower values of 2D:4D (∼0.98) than 
women (∼1); that is, men have relatively shorter index fingers (2D) as compared to ring 
fingers (4D). Low digit ratios are caused by high prenatal testosterone exposure, low 
prenatal estrogens, or both. Low digit ratios are associated with higher sperm numbers, 
good health, physical aggression, enhanced fairness considerations, greater number of 
sexual partners and greater number of children fathered, superior athletic and musical 
ability, and higher levels of courtship behavior in the presence of potential mates. 
High testosterone levels may affect economic decisions. In ultimatum game 
experiments, low-digit-ratio high-testosterone men tend to lose their drive for a good 
deal after viewing sexy pictures, a result also replicated for salivary testosterone. 
(Voracek and Loibl, 2009 provide a comprehensive survey of the digit ratio literature.) 
 We thus conjecture that low-digit ratio men make choices of risky prospects 
differently. Here, we find that their pattern of choice is indeed different. Men with 
relatively longer index fingers, that is, men with low prenatal testosterone exposure, are 
more likely to incur in the Allais paradox. 
Emotions 
Emotions surely play a role in one’s attitude toward risk, though this is ignored by 
  
 
 
expected utility theory. An emotion refers to a collection of body states’ changes 
triggered by the brain responding to specific contents of one’s perceptions, actual or 
recalled, relative to a particular object or event. The “somatic marker hypothesis” 
proposes that decision making is influenced by emotion through marker signals that 
arise in bio-regulatory processes. Without this emotional signal, people rely on a 
reasoned cost–benefit analysis involving both immediate and future consequences. 
However, knowledge without emotional signaling leads to dissociation between what 
one knows or says, and how one decides to act. Sound and rational decision making 
depends on prior accurate emotional processing. Though rationality has its place, the 
survival value of emotions like fear, disgust, and joy is obvious: “run away from it; 
don’t eat it; do more of it.” Emotion can be beneficial to decision making when it is 
integral to a task, but it can also be disruptive when unrelated to the task. 
The brain evolved to make emotional and rational decisions on the one hand, 
and controlled and automatic decisions on the other. Cost–benefit analysis only makes 
sense for controlled and rational decisions. People still evaluate the objective level of 
alternative risky choices as in the expected utility model, but they also react to risk 
emotionally. Risk-averse behavior may be governed by immediate responses to fear that 
occur in the amygdala. In risky choices, controlled and rational decisions can either 
cooperate or compete with automatic and emotional decisions. Fear can discourage 
people from taking advantageous gambles, but insufficient fear can produce non-
maximizing behavior when risky options have negative expected value. Sadness makes 
people prone to choose gambles of high-risk payoff. In contrast, anxiety tends to make 
people prone to choose gambles with low-risk payoffs. 
On the face of it, we conjecture that emotional states are related to the pattern of 
  
 
 
choice between alternative risky prospects, and thus to predisposition to the Allais 
paradox. In this study, we consider a very direct model to assess basic emotional states: 
a continuous affect scale ranging from “very anxious” and “moderately anxious” to 
“emotionless,” “moderately excited,” and “very excited.” We find that apart from the 
characteristic “very anxious,” all the others show relation with the manifestation of the 
Allais paradox. In particular, in the absence of emotions like anxiety and excitement, 
people are more inclined to show the paradox. 
Images from functional magnetic resonance imaging show that different levels 
of risk activate different brain areas. Prefrontal damage disconnects the cognitive and 
affective systems, and damaged patients do not store the pain of remembered losses. In 
general, normal people who react more emotionally to negative life events tend to be 
more risk averse than average. For some people, negative life events and depression are 
related. Women report slightly more negative life events than men do. Despite that, 
women are not actually more vulnerable to negative life events than men are (Dalgard et 
al., 2006). We thus consider this particular biological trait, and conjecture that negative 
life events not only influence one’s attitude toward risk but also one’s predisposition to 
incur in the Allais paradox. In our questionnaire, we asked subjects to report their 
perceived negative life events in a scale from 0 to 10 ranging from few negative events 
to many. We find that the subjects reporting few negative life events were more prone to 
manifest the Allais paradox. 
We also track the emotions of the subjects using the model of the affective 
circumplex (Russell, 1980) (Figure 1) because it arguably helps to explain both current 
research and clinical findings that are at odds with models of basic emotions, such as the 
representation described above (Posner et al., 2005). The circumplex model proposes 
  
 
 
that all affective states arise from two fundamental neurophysiological systems, one 
related to valence (a pleasure–displeasure continuum) and the other to arousal or 
alertness. Each emotion can be understood as a linear combination of these two 
dimensions, or as varying degrees of both valence and arousal. The circumplex model is 
believed to complement data from developmental, neuroimaging, and behavioral 
genetics studies of affective disorders (Posner et al., 2005). In this study, we find that 
emotions as measured by the affective circumplex also matter for the occurrence of the 
Allais paradox. We find that not aroused, not excited, unhappy, quiet, and tired people 
are more prone to exhibit the paradox. 
Religiousness 
Though it sounds odd at first sight, religiousness can also be considered a biological 
trait. This is so because there is neurological and evolutionary basis for religious 
experience. “Neurotheology” studies the human urge for religious myth from a 
neurological point of view. The hard facts about the bio-characteristics of God-believers 
have been unearthed by neurotheology. There may be hormonal basis for God-
believing, too. Studies using positron emission tomography find a relationship between 
low serotonin levels and self-transcendence for male subjects, a personality trait 
covering religious behavior and attitudes. The serotonin system may serve as a 
biological basis for spiritual experiences and explain why people vary greatly in 
spiritual zeal. The latter may also have a genetic basis. Serotonin and testosterone may 
be linked, too. When a high testosterone man is frustrated in his attempts to achieve 
dominance, serotonin comes into play. Low serotonin activity is associated with hyper-
responsiveness to aversive stimuli, and thus results in a greater likelihood of an 
intensely negative emotional reaction. (Religiousness as a biological trait is discussed in 
  
 
 
Joseph, 2002.) 
From the discussion above, it makes sense to argue that religiousness may 
interfere with both behavior and one’s attitude toward risk. We go further and 
conjecture that religiousness may also be related to the predisposition of a subject to 
incur in the Allais paradox. Here, we find that God-believers are more susceptible to the 
Allais paradox, though this result lacked statistical significance. 
Next section discusses the Allais paradox in more detail, along with the test 
statistics here employed to track it. 
2. Materials and methods 
The Allais paradox 
Consider the example given in the Introduction again. Take two pairs of lotteries: A and 
B along with C and D. 
 
A B 
the certainty of receiving 100 million a 10 percent chance of winning 500 
million 
an 89 percent chance of winning 100 
million 
a 1 percent chance of winning nothing 
 
C D 
an 11 percent chance of winning 100 
million 
an 89 percent chance of winning nothing 
a 10 percent chance of winning 500 
million 
a 90 percent chance of winning nothing 
 
 
Expected utility theory predicts that preference of A over B should entail the preference 
of C over D, and conversely. However, people often violate that in questionnaires. 
Expected utility theory is consistent with both the B and D answers and the A 
and C answers. Violations to the theory refer to the A and D answers, and the B and C 
answers. The fact that the violations in questionnaires are most of the B and C type, and 
  
 
 
not of the A and D type, suggests that they are systematic (Conlisk, 1989). Here, it is 
useful to identify two patterns of violations to expected utility theory. 
 
Pattern 1. Violations by the AD and BC answers. 
 
Pattern 2. Most answers are of the BC type rather than of the AD type (violations 
  are systematic). 
 
For testing pattern 1, two groups of subjects and the test statistic d are 
considered (Conlisk, 1989). The two groups considered in this study refers to the binary 
forms of our bio-characteristics, for example, male vs. female, subject aged 25 and 
below vs. subjects aged above 25, and so on (Table 1). 
 The test statistic d tracks the difference in the strength of pattern 1 between two 
groups. It has approximately a standard normal distribution under the null hypothesis 
that pattern 1 is equally strong for the two groups and can be defined as 
 
 
(1 ) (1 )
1 1
I II
I I II II
I II
V Vd
V V V V
N N
−= − −+− −
                                                                              (1)
 
 
where V (for violations) is the fraction of subjects who violate expected utility theory 
by giving the AD and BC answers, that is, 
 
 (AD) (BC)n nV
N
+= ,                                                                                           (2) 
 
where (AD)n  is the number of subjects answering A and D, (BC)n  is the number of 
  
 
 
subjects answering B and C, and N is the sample size. The two groups are labeled I and 
II. An improbably large positive value of d relative to the Gaussian provides evidence 
that pattern 1 is stronger in group I (Conlisk, 1989). (Observe that (2) should refer 
separately to either group I or II when calculating d using (1).) 
 Pattern 2 can be tested using the following test statistic Z (Conlisk, 1989): 
 
 
2
( 0.5) 1
0.25 ( 0.5)
S NZ
S
V
− −=
− −
                                                                                  
     (3) 
 
where S (for systematic) is the fraction of violators who answer BC rather than AD, that 
is, 
 
 (BC)
(BC) (AD)
nS
n n
= + .                                                                                           (4) 
 
This test statistic Z has approximately a standard normal distribution under the null 
hypothesis that violations to expected utility theory are purely random. Positive values 
of Z indicate systematic violations, and an improbably large Z-value relative to the 
Gaussian provides evidence of pattern 2 (Conlisk, 1989). 
We apply these tests to the data gathered in the questionnaire below and to the 
pre-questionnaire conveying information about the bio-characteristics of the subjects. 
Questionnaire 
The subjects were given the questions below, which draw on the questionnaire 
presented by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
 The first two pairs of questions are as follows. 
  
 
 
 
 
Question 1 
Choose between 
A B 
$2,500 with probability 33% 
$2,400 with probability 66% 
$0 with probability 1% 
$2,400 with certainty 
 
Question 2 
Choose between 
C D 
$2,500 with probability 33% 
$0 with probability 67% 
$2,400 with probability 34% 
$0 with probability 66% 
 
Kahneman and Tversky reported that most people usually choose B in Question 
1 and choose C in Question 2. Assuming the utility ($0) 0u = , the choice of B in 
Question 1 means .34 ($2, 400) .33 ($2,500)u u> . However, the choice of C in Question 
2 implies the reverse inequality. This constitutes a violation to expected utility theory. 
 The subsequent pairs of questions are 3 and 5 along with 4 and 6. These 
represent more variants of the Allais example highlighting the choice of risky prospects 
in both the domain of gains and the domain of losses respectively. 
 
Question 3 
Choose between 
A B 
$4,000 with probability 80% $3,000 with certainty 
 
Question 4 
Choose between 
A B 
A loss of $4,000 with probability 80% A loss of $3,000 with certainty 
 
Question 5 
Choose between 
C D 
$4,000 with probability 20% $3,000 with probability 25% 
 
Question 6 
  
 
 
Choose between 
C D 
A loss of $4,000 with probability 20% A loss of $3,000 with probability 25% 
 
Kahneman and Tversky observed that the majority of subjects usually choose B 
in Question 3, and C in Question 5. The choice of B in Question 3 implies 
($3,000) ($4,000) 4 5u u > , whereas the choice of C in Question 5 implies the reverse 
inequality. However, most subjects usually choose A in Question 4, and D in Question 
6. This shows that the preference between gambles of negative outcomes is the mirror 
image of the preference between gambles of positive outcomes. 
 The next pair (Questions 7 and 8) shows a version of the Allais example for 
nonmonetary outcomes. 
 
Question 7 
Choose between 
A B 
A three-week tour of England, France, and 
Italy with probability 50% 
A one-week tour of England with certainty 
 
Question 8 
Choose between 
C D 
A three-week tour of England, France, and 
Italy with probability 5% 
A one-week tour of England with 
probability 10% 
 
Kahneman and Tversky noted that most subjects usually choose B in Question 7, 
but choose C in Question 8. 
 The next pair (Questions 9 and 10) refers to situations where winning is possible 
but not probable, and most people choose the gamble that offers the largest gain. The 
last pair (Questions 11 and 12) shows the mirror image for losses. 
 
Question 9 
Choose between 
A B 
$6,000 with probability 45% $3,000 with probability 90% 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Question 10 
Choose between 
C D 
$6,000 with probability 0.1% $3,000 with probability 0.2% 
 
Kahneman and Tversky’s experiment showed that the majority of subjects 
choose B in Question 9, which implies .9 ($3,000) .45 ($6,000)u u> . However, they 
choose C in Question 10, which implies the reverse inequality. 
 
Question 11 
Choose between 
A B 
A loss of $6,000 with probability 45% A loss of $3,000 with probability 90% 
 
Question 12 
Choose between 
C D 
A loss of $6,000 with probability 0.1% A loss of $3,000 with probability 0.2% 
 
 
In the Kahneman and Tversky’s questionnaire, most subjects choose A in 
Question 11, which implies .45 ( $6,000) .90 ( $3,000)u u− > − . However, they choose D 
in Question 12, which implies the reverse inequality. 
 Note that all the answers in the Kahneman and Tversky’s questionnaire 
represented violations of either the AD or the BC type. Violations of the BC type 
occurred for the pairs (1, 2), (3, 5), (7, 8), and (9, 10), and violations of the AD type 
occurred for the mirror image for losses, that is, the pairs (4, 6) and (11, 12). 
Next, we present our own experiment related to such pairs of questions. 
Moreover, we go deeper and investigate how the biological characteristics of the 
subjects may be related to the violations to expected utility theory. 
Data 
  
 
 
The previous questions were distributed to 120 subjects (62 males and 58 females) from 
the Federal University of Santa Catarina, Brazil. These were students from economics, 
accounting, production engineering, and library science. The column “number of 
subjects” in Table 2 shows the valid number of answers to each pair of questions. The 
pre-questionnaire asking for the respondents’ bio-characteristics preceded the 
questionnaires. Table 1 shows the group description for every bio-characteristic. 
3. Results 
First, we tested for the occurrence of pattern 2 in the responses given to every pair of 
questions described above, that is, we assessed whether violations to expected utility 
theory in our experiment are significantly systematic. As observed, systematic 
violations mean that most answers are of the BC type rather than of the AD type. 
Table 2 shows the results of the test statistic Z described by equation (3). As 
observed, positive values of Z indicate systematic violations, and large Z-values (Z > 
2.00) relative to the Gaussian provide evidence of pattern 2. Table 2 shows that the Z-
values (in bold) are large (that is, greater than 2.00) for every pair of questions. This 
suggests that the Allais paradox appears in our experiment in all the versions presented, 
and that such violations to expected utility theory are systematic. 
 As for the role the subjects’ bio-characteristics play, Table 3 shows the results 
for the test statistic d (described by equation (1)) for the pairs of questions by 
considering the subject groups in Table 1. As seen, the statistic d tracks the difference in 
the strength of pattern 1 (that is, violations to expected utility theory through the AD 
and BC answers) between the two groups I and II, as defined in Table 1. Large positive 
values of d (d > 2.00) relative to the Gaussian provide evidence that pattern 1 is stronger 
in group I. Conversely, large negative values give evidence that pattern 1 is stronger in 
  
 
 
group II. Values in bold in Table 3 show the significant cases. Apart from the bio-
characteristics “handedness” and “religiousness,” all the rest are statistically significant 
in at least one pair of questions. 
 Table 3 shows that the subjects are more prone to exhibit the Allais paradox 
while choosing between the risky prospects depending on the following bio-
characteristics: gender, menstrual cycle, mother’s age, parenthood, digit ratio, perceived 
negative life events, and emotional state. (Observe that though the bio-characteristic 
“age” is not significant, “mother’s age” is.) Those who are more likely to show the 
paradox are (1) men subjects, (2) menstruating women, (3) boys born to young mothers, 
(4) childless subjects, (5) men with relatively longer index fingers, that is, with low 
prenatal testosterone exposure, (6) subjects that reported few negative life events, and 
(7) subjects reporting an emotional state of lack of anxiety, excitement, arousal, and also 
those who were unhappy, quiet, and tired. 
Table 4 shows the answers given by group for the pairs of questions where a 
bio-characteristic presents a significant d statistic in Table 3. As observed, evidence of 
the Allais paradox is given by the BC and AD answers. Positive (negative) d values are 
related to group I (group II). Violation to expected utility theory through the BC answer 
is the commonest for most bio-characteristics (that is, violations are systematic), apart 
from “menstrual cycle.” Also note that d is significant in both BC and AD types of 
answer for the pairs that are mirror images for losses, that is, the pairs (4, 6) and (11, 
12). 
Table 5 shows the answers given by the subjects by considering their 
handedness and religiousness. Though the statistic d is not statistically significant in 
both cases (d < 2.00), there is a clear tendency for the subjects to give the BC and AD 
  
 
 
answers, being the BC answer the commonest (that is, violations to expected utility 
theory are systematic). (Intriguingly, no left-hander gave the AD answer.) The positive 
d values in Table 5 are related to group I, that is, right-handers and God-believers 
(Table 1). Thus, left-handers and atheists are less prone to display the Allais paradox. In 
our sample, 21 percent are made of atheists, and 9.2 percent are of left-handers. We 
speculate that a sample greater than 231 subjects will confirm the pattern shown in 
Table 5 with a d  > 2.00. 
5. Conclusion 
We replicate the Allais example in the choice of alternative prospects in a sample of 120 
student subjects. In addition, we show that the following bio-characteristics were 
closely related to the propensity of one subject to incur in the Allais paradox: gender, 
menstrual cycle, mother’s age, parenthood, digit ratio, perceived negative life events, 
and emotional state. The Allais paradox is more likely in (1) men subjects, (2) 
menstruating women, (3) boys born to young mothers, (4) childless subjects, (5) men 
with low prenatal testosterone exposure, (6) subjects who reported to have experienced 
few negative life events, and (7) subjects reporting an emotional state of lack of anxiety, 
emotion, excitement, arousal, and also those who were unhappy, quiet, and tired. 
Right-handers and God-believers seem to be more susceptible to the Allais 
paradox, though this result is not statistically significant. However, we speculate that a 
larger sample will replicate this finding. 
 Put another way, our study suggests that women, in particular if not 
menstruating, are more “rational” in that they are less susceptible to the Allais paradox. 
Those born to not-too-young mothers are more rational, too. Those who father kids are 
also more rational. Those with high prenatal testosterone exposure are more rational. 
  
 
 
Those with many negative life events are also more rational. Anxious, excited, alerted, 
happy, active, and fresh people are also more rational. Left-handers and atheists are 
possibly more rational, too. 
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Figure 1. Affective circumplex: a graphical representation of the circumplex model of 
affect with the horizontal axis representing the valence dimension and the vertical axis 
representing the arousal or activation dimension. 
  
 
 
Table 1. Group description for every bio-characteristic 
 
Bio-characteristic Group I Group II 
gender female male 
menstrual cycle menstruating otherwise 
age age < 25 age ≥ 25 
mother’s age (mother’s age – boy’s age) ≤ 25 otherwise 
marital status single otherwise 
parenthood fathering children otherwise 
handedness right-hander left-hander 
digit ratio male with digit ratio 2D:4D < 1 otherwise 
negative life events few (≤ 5) many (> 5) 
emotional state 1 very anxious otherwise 
emotional state 2 moderately anxious otherwise 
emotional state 3 emotionless otherwise 
emotional state 4 moderately excited otherwise 
emotional state 5 very excited otherwise 
affective circumplex 1 aroused, excited. or happy otherwise 
affective circumplex 2 quiet or tired otherwise 
religiousness God-believer atheist 
 
 
Table 2. Systematic violations to expected utility theory in every pair of questions 
 
Pair of 
questions 
Systematic 
violations 
Non-systematic 
violations 
Number of 
subjects 
Z-value 
(1, 2) 42 13 108 4.20 
(3, 5) 54 18 113 4.61 
(4, 6) 45 19 112 3.40 
(7, 8) 61 9 116 7.58 
(9, 10) 68 7 112 9.40 
(11, 12) 42 14 114 3.98 
Note: The test statistic Z has approximately a standard normal distribution under the null 
hypothesis that violations to expected utility theory are purely random. Positive values 
of Z indicate systematic violations, and large (in bold) Z-values (> 2.00) relative to the 
Gaussian provides evidence of pattern 2 (that is, most answers are of the BC type rather 
than of the AD type). 
  
 
 
Table 3. Test statistic d for every pair of questions considering the groups in Table 1 
 
Pair of questions Bio-characteristic 
(1, 2) (3, 5) (4, 6) (7, 8) (9, 10) (11, 12) 
       
gender −2.34 0.59 −0.81 −0.07 −2.07 −0.58
menstrual cycle −0.08 −0.46 2.17 0.00 −0.40 −0.42
age −0.84 −0.33 −0.36 −0.48 −0.34 −0.53
mother’s age 0.62 −2.07 0.90 1.08 −0.04 1.01 
marital status 0.35 1.93 1.77 0.48 2.52 −0.35
parenthood −0.67 −0.91 −1.14 −0.63 −3.21 0.67 
handedness −1.17 0.52 0.73 1.67 0.00 −0.08
digit ratio −0.16 0.51 −2.03 −2.25 −0.81 0.50 
negative life events −0.37 2.29 −1.75 −0.59 −1.03 −0.95
emotional state 1 −0.39 0.33 1.25 −0.09 −0.87 0.94 
emotional state 2 1.78 −0.39 0.07 −0.04 −0.62 −2.02
emotional state 3 0.55 −1.08 0.69 1.22 1.31 4.57 
emotional state 4 −2.88 0.84 −1.27 0.66 0.04 −1.41
emotional state 5 0.95 0.33 −0.47 −2.04 1.06 1.07 
affective circumplex 1 −1.16 −0.32 −0.83 −0.17 −0.03 −2.31
affective circumplex 2 −0.55 −0.26 0.23 −0.72 −0.06 2.62 
religiousness 0.85 1.47 −0.54 −0.36 −0.75 0.87 
Note: The test statistic d tracks the difference in the strength of pattern 1 (that is, 
violations to expected utility theory through the BC and AD answers) between the two 
groups I and II, as defined in Table 1. The statistic d has approximately a standard 
normal distribution under the null hypothesis that pattern 1 is equally strong for the two 
groups. Large (in bold) positive values of d (d > 2.00) relative to the Gaussian provide 
evidence that pattern 1 is stronger in group I. Conversely, large (in bold) negative values 
give evidence that pattern 1 is stronger in group II. 
  
 
 
Table 4. Answers given by group for the pairs of questions where a bio-characteristic 
presents a significant d statistic in Table 3 
 
Answer given, % Bio-characteristic Pair of 
questions 
Statistic 
d 
Group
BC AD BD AC 
        
I 26.5 12.2 53.1 8.2 (1,2) −2.34 
II 49.2 11.9 20.3 18.6
I 51.0 5.9 27.4 15.7
gender 
(9, 10) −2.07 
II 68.9 6.6 18.0 6.5 
I 40.0 40.0 10.0 10.0menstrual cycle (4, 6) 2.17 
II 29.3 17.0 22.0 31.7
I 40.9 4.5 27.3 27.3mother’s age (3, 5) −2.07 
II 51.9 22.2 7.4 18.5
I 65.0 6.0 20.0 9.0 marital status (9, 10) 2.52 
II 25.0 8.3 41.7 25.0
I 11.1 11.1 44.4 33.4parenthood (9, 10) −3.21 
II 65.7 5.9 20.6 7.8 
I 38.7 9.7 25.8 25.8(4, 6) −2.03 
II 56.7 16.7 10.0 16.6
I 40.0 6.7 36.7 16.6
digit ratio 
(7, 8) −2.25 
II 67.7 6.5 16.1 9.7 
I 53.8 18.0 11.5 16.7negative life events (3, 5) 2.29 
II 34.6 11.5 30.8 23.1
I 30.4 6.5 30.5 32.6emotional state 2 (11, 12) −2.02 
II 40.6 15.6 29.7 14.1
I 54.5 36.4 9.1 0.0 emotional state 3 (11, 12) 4.57 
II 34.3 9.1 32.3 24.3
I 20.0 8.0 48.0 24.0emotional state 4 (1, 2) −2.88 
II 44.9 14.1 29.5 11.5
I 30.0 0.0 40.0 30.0emotional state 5 (7, 8) −2.04 
II 53.9 8.8 28.5 8.8 
I 25.0 6.3 40.6 28.1affective circumplex 1 (11, 12) −2.31 
II 41.5 13.0 26.0 19.5
I 51.3 12.8 23.1 12.8affective circumplex 2 (11, 12) 2.62 
II 28.6 10.0 34.3 27.1
Note: Evidence of the Allais paradox is given by the BC and AD answers. Positive 
(negative) d values are related to group I (group II). Violation to expected utility theory 
by the BC answer is the commonest for every bio-characteristic (that is, violations are 
systematic), apart from “menstrual cycle.” 
  
 
 
Table 5. Answers given by the subjects by considering their handedness and 
religiousness 
 
Answer given, % Bio-characteristic Pair of questions Statistic d Group 
BC AD BD AC 
        
I 53.8 8.5 27.3 10.4handedness (7, 8) 1.67 
II 40.0 0.0 40.0 20.0
I 47.7 19.3 13.7 19.3religiousness (3, 5) 1.47 
II 45.8 4.2 29.2 20.8
Note: The positive d values are related to group I, that is, right-handers and God-
believers (Table 1). Though the statistic d is not statistically significant in both cases (d 
< 2.00), there is a clear tendency for the subjects to give the BC and AD answers, being 
the BC answer the norm (that is, violations to expected utility theory are systematic). 
